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Roadmap

Use these guides for current instructions. The dated plans below preserve earlier priorities.

AreaCurrent entry pointRemaining boundary
Interactive workConsoleThe terminal interface for running scans and reviewing findings.
Multi-model workConfiguration and API KeysRole assignments must use models supported by the selected provider or gateway; child agents do not automatically switch provider accounts.
Find, verify, and repairScan Workflows and secureReproduction, repair verification, publication, and overall completion are separate outcomes. Local repair executes with the worker’s permissions.
Saved scan continuationScan WorkflowsResume routing and available state vary by producer; it is not universal recovery for every command.
Findings and triageCommands and Finding TriageTriage state is not proof that a vulnerability was reproduced or fixed.
Diff-aware review and CIIntegrations and GitHub CILocal/scripted CI support does not imply a published composite action.
Deterministic verificationVerification ResultsReplay requires executable inputs and valid setup; it does not cover every candidate automatically.
Research adaptersResearch WorkflowsImported evidence is distinct from execution performed by 0.
Extensions and improvementHackstore and Improvement PlaneInstallation, enablement, execution approval, evaluation, and promotion are distinct steps.
Optional Jev assistanceCapabilitiesOpt-in advisory assistance has separate configuration and budgets; it is not a verification oracle.

0cloud has implemented CLI and server integration for authentication, enrollment, managed scans, and schedules. A public sign-in page or implemented endpoint does not establish account entitlement, a compatible deployed version, or qualified end-to-end operation. The complete self-serve managed path has not been qualified by this documentation audit. Contact the team to agree access, scope, spend, and deliverables.

Before automating managed work, read the concrete client/server compatibility limits in connect and service, especially repository schedule filtering and remote cost-ceiling enforcement.

Hosted inference has its own availability and account-compatibility boundary. Signing in does not establish hosted spend, managed execution or PR-review entitlement.

Desktop remains in development, without a public download. Use the Console for terminal work.

Documentation follows the source checkout. Check 0 --version and 0 <command> --help against your installed release before using newly documented flags.

Priorities: reliable execution, usable evidence, and orchestration.

The retained XBOW aggregate is 103/104 = 99.0%; the retained gpt-5.4 cohort is 93/95 = 97.9%. Consolidation pools retained attempts and modes, so the latter must not be presented as an isolated black-box or single-shot result. The first scored full Cybench record is 36/40 = 90.0%. See Benchmarks and Methodology for denominators, retry policies, evidence retention, and the separate older publication lines. These measurements are historical results, not a current product acceptance test.

August 2026 checkpoint: the strategy had selected no commercial vertical. It described a scoped reasoning-and-execution platform with replayable evidence.

  1. scenario / objective
  2. target adapter
  3. scoped tool policy
  4. reasoning and execution loop
  5. verifier / evidence oracle
  6. replayable evidence bundle

Web testing, source review, package audit, MCP testing, and agent assurance are applications of those primitives. New modes should strengthen one of them.

  • Generic autonomous web pentesting — a core OSS capability, but a crowded commercial category. Benchmark strength alone doesn’t establish a paid wedge.
  • Agent-action assurance — a candidate paid workflow: can a company prove a tool-using agent cannot perform a named prohibited action after a model, prompt, tool, or MCP change? The agent-assure command supplies the initial scope-bound, externally observed action primitive.
  • Managed operation — if a workflow proves repeat use, the managed layer sells scheduling, protected-target access, shared evidence, triage, integrations, and support around the public engine. It must not depend on a private fork of the scanner.

For each candidate workflow, interview ten companies with a target and security owner; sell three paid pilots; require an authorized staging target, a defined success or prohibited action, and replayable evidence. Measure collected revenue, remediation decisions, and repeat demand. Build blockers recurring across at least two pilots before committing to a vertical.

FoxGuard is now the default static lead source and the stepping stone away from Semgrep. The direction:

  1. Keep the TypeScript control plane for agent orchestration, provider integration, CLI/cloud contracts, benchmark loops, and fast policy iteration.
  2. Move deterministic engines into Rust behind stable JSON/SARIF contracts.
  3. Make FoxGuard the first engine that proves this boundary with measured lead quality and wall-time wins.

Trust-track implications:

  • FoxGuard validation gate — run the Semgrep-vs-FoxGuard ablation; keep FoxGuard as default only if it preserves confirmed findings while materially improving wall time.
  • Scanner language cleanup — migrate prompts/docs from “Semgrep findings” to scanner-neutral language, keeping JSON fields backwards-compatible until a schema migration is worth the churn.
  • Rust engine expansion — after FoxGuard proves the boundary, evaluate secret scanning, dependency inventory normalization, SARIF/CBOM transforms, large-repo indexing, and sandbox/process helpers as Rust engines.
  • No wholesale Rust rewrite yet — revisit only under measured runtime, distribution, sandbox, or multi-consumer pressure.

See TypeScript/Rust Boundary.

These entry points exist in the source checkout. Check your installed CLI’s help and the linked guides for availability, configuration, and execution limits; this section does not infer release status from source presence.

  • Isolated improvement workers and promotion canaries. The 0 evolve CLI provides config-driven source candidate proposals with explicit allowModelSourceAccess consent, three-lane evaluation (development/held-out/negative-control) in network-none Docker containers, content-addressed immutable snapshots, pure-function promotion gates, canary trials, rollback, and hash-chained registries with atomic artifact publication. Configured autoPromote controls promotion autonomy. Execution isolation depends on the selected worker backend and its deployment. Improvement Plane.
  • Operational feedback curation. 0 evolve feedback capture/approve/status/release for evidence-backed observations with operator-curated ValidationFixture arrays (positives, heldOut, negativeControls), source access consent, and content-digest drift detection.
  • Skill/router artifact bridge. artifact-bridge.mjs authorizes candidate artifacts against the evolution registry before skill-refine or active-learning loops may promote them.
  • 0 lens-synth --status and --rollback for inspecting and retiring promoted overlay lenses.

  • Retained artifact-backed XBOW aggregate at 103/104. The retained gpt-5.4 cohort is 93/95 = 97.9%, not an independently established single-shot black-box result. Consolidation pools retained attempts and modes; artifact rotation can change which supporting runs remain available.
  • First scored full Cybench run at 36/40 = 90.0%. Single-config (Azure gpt-5.4), with the recorded allowance of 3 retries per challenge, 358 attack turns, ~$14.89. Supersedes the older 8/10 subset.
  • Historical public XBOW line tracked separately — 90/104 black-box, 95/104 aggregate after purging unsupported claim residue.
  • Estimated-cost guards — native scan loops retain partial findings and stop when an observed ceiling trips. In-flight work can overshoot; see Budget Management for current coverage and limitations.
  • Direct OSV advisory lookup in the npm audit pipeline — no more relying on npm audit alone.
  • Phase 4 pre-recon CVE check for white-box mode — fingerprints the stack against known vulns before attacking.
  • Phase A flag-regex extractor + gate filters — caught the XBEN-079 honeypot decoy (FLAG{I'm_a_Script_Kiddie}) before it became a silent false positive.
  • Phase B malicious-package detection in the audit pipeline.
  • Orchestrator handshake (Phase 1) — OSS-engine findings can be normalised and ingested by an orchestrator that tracks scan jobs end-to-end.
  • A/B sweep cadence — historical overnight feature-combination sweeps. Consult Research Workflows for current entry points rather than assuming an older workflow still exists.

The following goals preserve earlier planning context, not current delivery commitments. Implemented portions are identified explicitly.

Goal: stop the agent declaring victory on the first flag-shaped string when the target seeds a fake one.

Why: on XBEN-079 the agent submitted FLAG{I'm_a_Script_Kiddie} (real flag: FLAG{7dda4e738d29a996f343a610}). The flag-extractor gate caught the mismatch — but a non-CTF target could plant a decoy in .git/config and the agent would submit it.

Current implementation: the done tool’s decoy-shape heuristic is enabled by default and can be disabled with --no-decoy-detection. It rejects a low-confidence flag once; a repeated submission can override it. This is a benchmark-oriented speed bump.

2. Statistical evaluation methodology — n=10 per cell

Section titled “2. Statistical evaluation methodology — n=10 per cell”

Goal: replace single-shot anecdotes with per-attempt success rates and confidence intervals.

Why: the v1 sweep’s single XBEN-061 solve with a handoff,no-hiw,no-evidence combo looked like a winner. The v2 sweep re-ran it as a regression test — it failed. That solve was noise inside a 20-40% per-attempt rate. A single solve is an anecdote; any config recommendation from one solve is unsafe to promote.

Deliverables: --repeat N harness flag reporting success rate + CI; default n=10 per cell before any promotion to default; per-cell cost ceiling (~$5); a methodology page on best-of-N (what XBOW reports) vs per-attempt success rate (what we measure).

Goal: resume a dead long-running scan from stored state instead of restarting.

Why: the repo already persists agent_sessions and pipeline_events; restarting long agentic workflows is expensive.

Current implementation: 0 resume <scan-id> and journal continuation exist. The remaining goal is reliable recovery across all workflows. Read Scan Workflows for supported routing, state requirements, and caveats.

Goal: make findings manageable across repeated runs.

Why: repeated findings need dedupe, suppression, and audit history.

Current implementation: the findings command exposes grouped findings, triage filtering, and lifecycle inspection. The CLI’s human triage values are new, accepted, and suppressed, separate from finding verification state. The broader suppression-expiry, comments, and cross-run workflow described here remains a design goal unless documented by a current command.

Goal: make the GitHub Action fast enough to run on every PR — changed files first, expand when suspicious.

Current implementation: review --diff-base <ref> --changed-only scopes static leads and prioritization to changed files. See GitHub CI for the supported automation path. Broader PR policy and automatic fallback behavior are goals, not implied by the presence of these flags.

Goal: every confirmed finding reproducible on demand.

Deliverables: replay from finding ID; saved exploit inputs/requests/prompts; verifier transcript and verdict trace; shareable artifact bundle.

Goal: scan many repos, packages, or endpoints as one campaign. Concurrent subagents already fan out within a single run (spawn_agents); this item is the campaign-scale layer above that.

Use campaigns for multi-target research, parallel verification, and aggregate evidence.

Deliverables: campaign runs; worker-pool / concurrency controls; queueing and retry policy; shared target inventory and cross-target clustering.

Goal: expose stored scan state as a real operator interface for running the control plane, working the review inbox, and inspecting runtime failures.

Current implementation: local dashboard and console interfaces exist. Desktop is in development; see Roadmap for current status. Use Console for the released terminal interface.

Suppressions as code; severity gates by environment; org-level runtime/model defaults; approved attack template sets.

10. Richer target inventory and trend analysis

Section titled “10. Richer target inventory and trend analysis”

First-/last-seen attack-surface changes; recurring finding families; regression alerts; “what changed since last green run.”

11. Distributed workers / remote execution

Section titled “11. Distributed workers / remote execution”

The historical proposal covered remote queue workers, campaign execution, and a shared artifact store. A hosted control plane is no longer merely hypothetical: current managed-service implementation and qualification boundaries are described under 0cloud. Broader campaign behavior remains a separate question.

Local analysis, CI review, retained evidence, and campaign orchestration need reproducible results and bounded workers. UI scaffolding alone establishes no managed-service availability. EGATS remains opt-in after its unfavorable ablation.